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I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ISLAMIC INHERITANCE SYSTEM

A Muslim who wishes to make arrangements for the
transmission of his property to the next generation must consider
a wide range of variables, including, on the one hand, the nature
and extent of his economic assets, and, on the other, the people
to whom he wants to transmit these assets. In fourteenthcentury Damascus or Fez, the economic assets of an urban
Muslim notable typically might have included one or more of the
following:
a house, compound, workshop, bakery, garden,
orchard, or olive grove. The people to whom he might want to
transmit these assets would have included his children, spouse,
and agnatic relatives. A decision about who would receive what
property and in what amounts was likely to be affected, in turn,
by demographic considerations and by specific characteristics of
the individual members of the family, such as birth order, gender,
marital status, residence patterns, age, financial situation, and
personality. All of these factors would intersect in a complex but
intangible manner, with the nature of the affective relations
between and among a proprietor, spouse, children, and other
relatives.
A. Compulsory InheritanceRules

Any decision that a person makes regarding the inheritance
of his estate will be the result of a complex calculus that involves
the weighing of shifting social, economic, demographic, and
personal considerations. In Muslim societies, a person's ability to
make such calculations is frustrated, in theory, by the

compulsory Islamic inheritance rules that impose substantial
constraints upon the freedom of a person contemplating death to
determine the devolution of his or her property.' Under such
rules, bequests may not exceed one-third of an estate, and may
not be made in favor of any person who qualifies as a legal heir,
unless the other heirs give their consent. 2 Compulsory rules for
the division of property have their basis in Qur'anic verses that
traditionally have been understood as recognizing two classes of

1.
See N. J. COULSON, SUCCESSION IN THE MUSLIM FAMILY 259-79 (1971)
(setting forth specific rules that apply to changes in circumstances that occur
during "death-sickness").
2.
See id. at 213-14.
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One group is classified as "sharers," that is, those

persons for whom the Qur'an specifies a fractional share of the
estate-daughters (in the absence of sons), a father, mother, or

4
spouse-and, in the absence of children, one or more siblings.
The other group comprises agnates, arranged in a series of
hierarchical classes.5 The raison d'etre of the Islamic inheritance
rules is to insure the systematic and consistent application of a
formula for the division of property that is regarded as having
been divinely revealed, and to prevent the familial strife that may
result from mere human calculation.6 "Your fathers and your
sons," Qur'an 3:14 teaches, "you know not which of them is
7
closer to you in usefulness."
The division of an estate follows a two-step process in which
the qualifying "sharers" take their Qur'anic entitlements, then the
closest surviving agnate inherits whatever remains. 8
For
example, if a man dies leaving his wife, one son, two daughters,
and two brothers, the wife inherits one-eighth of the estate as a
"sharer" and the children inherit the remaining seven-eighths of
the estate according to the Qur'anic principle, "the share of a
male is equal to that of two females." 9 Thus, the son inherits
seven-sixteenths (7/16) of the estate while each daughter inherits
seven-thirty-seconds (7/32) of the estate.
As the closest
surviving agnates, the sons and daughters totally exclude the
decedent's brothers from the inheritance.
Theoretically, the
person contemplating death is powerless to affect the relative
entitlement of his heirs.1 0 In the example, if the decedent's son
took care of him in his old age and his daughters were both
married to wealthy men, the decedent could not stipulate that the
bulk of his estate would pass to his son upon his death.
Similarly, he could neither disinherit a child from whom he had
become alienated, nor increase the share of a child of whom he
was especially fond.

3.
See David S. Powers, The Art the Legal Opinion: al-Wansharision Tawlij,
in ISLAMIC LEGAL INTERPRETATION: MUFTIS AND THEIR FATWAS 98, 99 (Muhammad
Khalid Masud, et al. eds, 1996).
4.
See il.
5.

See icL

6.
See id.
7.
QUR'AN 4:13.
COULSON, supra note 1.

For further details on inheritance law, see generally
For a revisionist approach to the Qur'anic inheritance

verses, see generally DAVID S. POWERS, STUDIES IN QUR'AN AND HADITH: THE
FORMATION OF THE ISLAMIC LAW OF INHERITANCE (1986); see also Richard Kimber,

The Qur'anic Law ofInheritance, 5 ISLAMIC L. & SOCY 291-325 (1998) (discussing
how the Sunni law of inheritance relies on interpretations of the Qur'anic
inheritance verses).
8.
See Powers, supranote 3, at 99.
9.
QUR'AN 4:12.
10.
See Powers, supra note 3, at 99.
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B. Circumventing the Rules
During the first two centuries of Islamic history, Muslims
throughout the Near East found themselves subject to these
compulsory rules of partible inheritance. 1 To the extent that
they were applied, these rules frustrated the desires of
proprietors to make the kind of calculations referred to above and
12
resulted in the progressive fragmentation of wealth and capital.
It is perhaps not surprising that Muslims found numerous ways
to circumvent the compulsory inheritance rules and that they
received important assistance in this regard from jurists.'- By
distinguishing between post mortem and inter vivos transactions,
jurists taught Muslims that the inheritance rules apply only to
property owned by the decedent at the moment he enters his
deathbed illness and that a proprietor is free to dispose of his
property in any way he wishes prior to that moment. 14 There
were no restrictions on the amount of property that a person
might alienate during his lifetime, whether in favor of his eventual
heirs or a "stranger."' 5 Therefore, a proprietor might shift assets
to his desired heir or heirs by means of an inter vivos transaction,
such as a gift, charitable donation, sale, or acknowledgment of a
debt, provided that these transactions conformed to the requisite
legal formalities.16
In other words, a Muslim proprietor who wanted to avoid the
application of the compulsory Islamic inheritance rules had to
engage in some form of pre-mortem "estate planning" by making
real or nominal transfers of property to his desired heirs. Such
practices were common already in eighth-century Medina, in
twelfth-century al-Andalus, and in fourteenth- and fifteenthcentury Maghrib. Indeed, they are likely to have been common in
17
Muslim societies at most times and places.

The most important variation of a gift inter vivos was the
family endowment (waqf ahli).

Like a simple gift, a family

11.
See id.
12.
See id.
13.
See id.
14.
See id. On the doctrine of deathbed illness and its historical
development, see generally Hiroyuld Yanagihashi, The Doctrinal Development of
"mnarad al-mawt" in the Formative Period of Islamic Law, 5 ISLAMIC L. & SOcY 326
(1998).
15.
See Powers, supranote 3, at 99.
16.
See id. On such transactions, see generally David S. Powers, The
Islamic Inheritance System: A Socio-HistoricalApproach, in ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW,
11-29 (Chibli Mallat & Jane Conners eds., 1990) [hereinafter Powers, The Islamic

Inheritance System].
17.
See generally, e.g., Powers, The Islamic Inheritance System, supra note
16; Powers, supra note 3; David S. Powers, The Art of the Judicial Opinion: On
Tawlij in Fifteenth-CenturyTunis, 5 ISLAMIC L. & SOCT 359 (1998).
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endowment made it possible for a proprietor legally to remove
part or all of his estate from the effects of the Islamic inheritance
laws and to reduce the quantum of property available as an
inheritance for ascendants, collaterals, and spouses. Further,
the creation of a family endowment enabled the proprietor to
establish a lineal descent group with exclusive usufructory rights
to the endowment revenues and to define the descent strategy
according to which these rights pass from one generation to the
next, theoretically, in perpetuity.1 8 Thus, a family endowment
provided a means of ensuring that property would remain intact
throughout the generations.
The Qur'an contains no reference to the institution of waqf,
which, most historians agree, emerged during the first and
second Islamic centuries (the seventh- and eighth-centuries
C.E.). 19 During this period, Muslim jurists identified two key
legal principles: (1) the distinction between real property (as4 and
the revenue or usufruct (manfa'a)generated by that property; and
(2) the notion that real property could be sequestered in
perpetuity. 20 These two ideas are clearly reflected in an anecdote
attributed to the Prophet Muhammad:
Verily, 'Jmar b. al-Khattab owned some land called Thamgh, which

was a valuable date grove.
Umar said [to the Prophet], "0
Messenger of God, I have acquired property that is dear to me. May
I give it away as alms?" The Messenger of God replied, "Dedicate

its principal as alms, but it may not be sold, nor given away as a
21
gift, nor inherited."
In another version, the Prophet recommends to Umar that he

"sequester its principal and dedicate its fruits to charitable

purposes."

22

It is not certain that Muhammad in fact uttered these words
to 'Umar.
Indeed, pious, well-meaning Muslims may have
attributed them to the Prophet during the century following his
death in 632 C.E. 23 Nevertheless, by the end of the first Islamic
century and beginning of the second, incontrovertible evidence
exists of a sophisticated pious endowment. 2 4 For instance, a

18.

See SHORTER ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 626 (H.A.R. Gibb & J.H.

Kramers eds., 1965).
19.
See id. at 626.
20.
See id. at 624.
21.

4 AHMAD B. MUHAMMAD AL-TAHAWI, SHAR MA'ANI AL-ATHAR, LI-ABI

JA'FAR AHMAD IBN MUHAMMAD IBN SALAMAH IBN 'ABD AL-MALIK IBN SALAMAH ALAZD: AL-HAJAR: AL-MISRI AL-TAHAWI AL-HANAFI. HAQQAQA-HU WA QADDAMA LAHU

WA 'ALLAQA ALAYH MUHAMMAD SAYYID JAD AL-HAQQ 95 (al-Qahirah, Matba'at al-

Anwar al-Muhammadiyah 1968).
22.

4

MUHAMMAD

B.

IDRIS

AL-SHAFI,

KITAB

AL-UMM

52-53,

58,

(Muhammad Zuhri al-Najiar ed. Maktabat al-Kulliyat al-Azhariyya, 1961) (1903).
23.

See SHORTER ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, supranote 18, at 626.

24.

See id. at 627.
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deed in which a well-known jurist designated his house in Fustat
as a familial endowment is attested for the end of the eighth
century C.E. Other examples follow in profusion. During the
first half of the ninth-century C.E., two treatises devoted to the
institution of waqf were written by Hilal al-Ra'y and al-Khassaf,
respectively. 25
Clearly, the emergence of the Islamic pious
endowment pre-dates the emergence of the trust in Western
26
Europe by several hundred years.
C. Sources of Evidence
The Islamic endowment can be studied from a wide range of
documentary and literary sources. The primary documentary
source is the endowment deed (among the Malikis, rasm al tahbis;
elsewhere, waafiyya). The literary sources include the standard
collections of prophetic hadith, early juridical treatises, doctrinal
lawbooks, and collections of judicial opinions (fatawa, plural of
fatwa). This article focuses exclusively on the Maliki school of
law, which was prevalent in the Islamic West. The conclusions
presented here are based upon an analysis of 101 judicial
opinions, or fatwas, contained in volume seven of the Kitab al
Mi'yar of Ahmad al-Wansharisi (d. 1508).27 These opinions were

issued by prominent Malikd muftis living in the major towns of
Muslim Spain (Cordoba and Granada), the Maghrib (Fez and
Tlemcen), and Ifriqiya (Qayrawan and Tunis) between the tenth
and sixteenth centuries C.E. Taken individually, these fatwas

provide only a truncated and fragmentary picture of the Malild
family endowment. Most fatwas are less than a page long and
focus on one or more technical aspects of the institution. A
smaller number contain supplementary documentation that
makes it possible to trace the history of an endowment from the
year of its creation until the year in which the fatwa was

25.

On the formation of the Islamic law of Waee,

see generally Peter

Charles Hennigan, The Birth of a Legal Institution: The Formation of the Waqffin
Third Century A.H. Hanafi Legal Discourse (1999) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Cornell University) (on file with author).
26.
See Henry Cattan, The Law of Wa, in 1 LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC LAW 203, 213 (photo. reprint 1970) (Majid
Khadduri & Herbert J. Liebesny eds. 1955).
27.
7 ABU AL-'ABBAS AHMAD B. YAHYA AL-WANSHARISI, AL-MI'YAR ALMUGHRIB WA'L-JAMI AL-MU'RIB 'AN FATAWI AHL IFRIQIYA WAL-ANDALUS WA AL-

MAGHRIB (Rabat: Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs 1981-83) [hereinafter 7
AL-WANSHARISI]. For a French translation of selected fatwas based upon the
earlier lithograph edition published in Fez in 1896-97, see 12, 13 E. AMAR, La
Pierrede touche des fetwas, de Ahmad al-Wanscharisi, in ARCHIVES MAROCAINES
(1907-08). For a convenient summary of the contents of the Miyar, see VINCENT
LAGARD-RE, HISTOIRE ET SOCI'TP, EN OCCIDENT MUSULMAN AU MOYEN AGE:
ANALYSE DU MIT'AR DAL-WAN$ARI!I (1995).
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issued).28 For historical investigation, the fatwas are best utilized
when treated as a single corpus exhibiting the characteristic
The
features of the pre-modern Malild family endowment.
is
fatwas
of
these
distribution
chronological
and
geographical
such
treatment.
allow
for
sufficiently narrow to

II. AN ANALYSIS OF ENDOWMENT DEEDS

A. Legal Doctrine
The Maliki jurist Ibn 'Arafa (d. 1400) defined a waqc as the
grant of the usufruct of a thing that is binding on the donor for
the duration of the thing's existence. The ownership of the thing
remains-hypothetically-with the donor, though he is no longer

entitled to use the substance of the property. 2 9 If the usufruct
can no longer be applied to the purpose for which the endowment
was created, the property reverts to the ultimate beneficiary,
usually a religious institution.3 0 To be valid, a family endowment
must satisfy certain general requirements. First, the founder
must be an adult Muslim in good health and acting of his own
free will. Second, the founder must use certain prescribed words
and verb forms conventionally understood as signifying the
notion of perpetuity, such as waj, hubs, sadaqa muharrama, or
la yuhab wa la yuba Third, the object of the endowment must
be property whose utilization will not result in its dissipation or
consumption. 3 ' Most endowments were created from immovable
revenue-producing property, such as land or shops.3 2 Fourth, a
founder was enjoined from excluding one or more children as

See David S. Powers, A Court Casefrom Fourteenth-CenturyNorth Africa,
28.
110 J. AM. ORIENTAL SOc'Y 229-254 (1990) [hereinafter Powers, A Court Case]
(translating and analyzing a significant number of documents dealing with a
lengthy, inter-family conflict over control of a family endowment); David S. Powers,
Fatwas as Sources for Legal and Social History: A Dispute over Endowment
Revenues from Fourteenth-Century Fez, 11 AL-QANTARA 295-341 (1990)

[hereinafter Powers, Fatwas].
29.
See SHORTER ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM, supra note 18, at 625 (noting
that the Malikis are the main subscribers to this view of ownership in waqf

property).
See 7 AL-WANSHARISI, supra note 27, at 12-14. Ownership is a point
30.
that sharply distinguishes the waqffrom the English trust. Neither the founder of
the waqf nor its supervisor may subsequently alienate the property that has been
endowed. According to some observers, this makes the waqf a less flexible
instrument than the trust.
See id. at 88-90.
31.
See id. (explaining that shares of jointly held property could be
32.
designated as an endowment, although the procedure varied depending on

whether or not the property in question was divisible).
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beneficiaries of the endowment.3 3 Family endowments created in
favor of males to the exclusion of females were declared null and
void by Malik b. Anas, the founder of the Maliki school of law. It
was permitted, however, to stipulate that the share of a male was
to be equal to that of two females, in accordance with a wellknown Qur'anic inheritance verse.3 4 Fifth, the creation of the
endowment had to be declared formally in a legal ceremony in
which two notary-witnesses attest to their presence at, and their
witnessing of, the actual physical transfer of the property from
the founder to the beneficiary. This ceremony, known among the
Malikis as hiyaza (conveyance or taking possession), could be
waived in certain circumstances, including when a founder
created an endowment on behalf of his minor children.3 5 The
ceremony served to publicize the establishment of the endowment
potential creditors or purchasers of the property's
and to inform
36
new status.
A family endowment may be created between two living
beings (inter vivos) or by means of a last will and testament. An
inter vivos endowment takes effect immediately, cannot be
revoked by the founder, and is not subject to any restriction with
regard to its size. A testamentary endowment takes effect only
upon the founder's death, may be revoked by the founder at any
time prior to that occurrence, and is subject to the normal
constraints on Muslim wills, which may not exceed one-third of a
person's net assets and may not be made in favor of a legal
heir.3 7
In the Mi'yar, endowments created inter vivos are
mentioned more frequently than testamentary endowments.
The specific terms of a family endowment are set out in an
endowment deed, a legal instrument drafted with great care in an
effort to eliminate any possible ambiguity. In the words of the
fifteenth-century Fasi jurist, al-Mawasi, "Legal documents are
predicated upon the removal of all ambiguities and summary
statements.., even if this causes them to run on at great
length."3 8 The founder customarily begins by designating the
first generation of beneficiaries, usually one or more children, and
by indicating whether or not males and females are to be treated

33.
See id. (referring to an injunction that derives from a hadith in which
the Prophet reportedly rebuked a man who had made a charitable gift to one of
his sons, saying, "Fear God and treat your children equally.").
34.
See QUR'AN, 4:12.
35.
See 7 AL-WANSHARISI, supra note 27, at 321-29 (explaining that the
waiver was not allowed in the case of a house in which the founder continued to
reside).
36.

See id. at 48, 81, 88-90, 226-27, 321-29, 444.

37.

See id. at 21-29, 75-76, 311-21, 463-64, 477-78.

38.

See id. at 346.
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equally.3 9 Next, the founder indicates what happens to the
revenues belonging to a beneficiary of the first generation upon
his death. If that beneficiary leaves a child, his share reverts to
that child; if the beneficiary dies without a child, his share reverts
to the surviving beneficiaries of the first generation or their
descendants. In this manner, the entitlement of extinct branches
reverts to the surviving branches (per stirpes) of the lineal
descent group. 4°
This pattern for the transmission of entitlement from the first
generation of beneficiaries to the second may apply to the
transmission of entitlement from the second generation to the

third, although this is not necessarily the case. Referring to the
second generation of beneficiaries, the founder generally indicates
that the revenues are "for their descendants and their
descendants' descendants, etc." Such phrasing generally was
understood by the jurists as signifying that the entitlement now
applies to anyone who qualifies as either a descendant ('aqib) of
the founder or a descendant of a descendant. In other words, two
or more generations of lineal descendants may qualify as
beneficiaries simultaneously. At this stage, such an endowment
is characterized as being mu'aqqab (for a descent group). If a
member of the second generation of beneficiaries dies, his share
reverts to the surviving beneficiaries of the second generation and
to beneficiaries of all subsequent generations. In such cases, the
revenues are divided among the qualifying beneficiaries, either
41
per capita or according to need.
A founder who does not want an endowment to become
mu'aqqab must use some particle, word, or phrase conventionally
understood as signifying that the entitlement does not pass from
the first to the second generation of beneficiaries-or from the
second to the third, and so on-until all members of a given
generation have died out. For example, the founder may use the
particle thumma (then), as in the phrase, "then for their
descendants," or the phrase "one [generation] after the other"
(awwalan fa awwalan). The revenues in an endowment of this
type are distributed exclusively among the members of a single
generation. If a qualified beneficiary dies, his entitlement passes
to the surviving beneficiaries of the same generation, whether or
not the decedent had a child. Thus, as the members of a single
generation of beneficiaries die, the revenues accumulate in the

39.

The Malikis, unlike the Hanafis, do not allow a founder to designate

himself or herself as the initial beneficiary. See Aharon Layish, The Maliki Family
Waqf According to WIlls and Waqfiyyat, BULLETIN OF THE SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND
AFRICAN STUDIES, § 46:1, at 5-6 (1983).
40.
See, e.g., id. at 29-30, 67, 267, 269, 279, 343, 355, 360, 396, 442.
41.
See id. at 141, 280, 357, 398.

1176

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 32:1167

hands of the surviving members of that generation until the
longest living member eventually controls the entire endowment.
Upon that individual's death, the revenues are divided per capita
among the next generation of beneficiaries, whereupon the
process begins again.
Whether or' not the endowment is mu'aqqab, when a line of
beneficiaries dies out completely, the revenues revert to the
charitable purpose specified by the founder, usually a mosque or
some other religious institution.
B. Social Practice
1. Motives and Function
In Islam, charity begins at home. A man's first obligation,
before other charitable purposes, is his family. According to a
report attributed to the Prophet, "It is better to leave your heirs
rich than to leave them destitute, begging from others."4 2 A
family endowment is thus regarded as an expression of the
founder's desire to perform an act of charity, for which he or she
will be rewarded in the hereafter. The charitable motive may be
indicated explicitly, as in an endowment created "for the poor
among my children and my children's children," or "for the needy
of so-and-so's family,"4 or for the founder's "needy relatives on
44
both his father's and mother's sides."
The pietistic urge is manifested in the testamentary
endowments preserved in our source. Drafted toward the end of
a person's life, these documents reflect the founder's anticipation
of final judgment in the hereafter. By creating an endowment for
some pious purpose, the founder hoped to earn divine reward in
the next life, a hope that was expressed in formulaic phrases that
appear repeatedly in the deeds. Most commonly, the founder
indicated that he was seeking "the face of God the Almighty and
the abundance of His momentous reward."45
This formula
invariably was followed by the citation of Qur'an 18:30, "surely
we leave not to waste the wage of him who does good works."46
The pietistic motive of a family endowment must be
distinguished from its many practical functions.
A family
endowment might be created for a wide variety of reasons, such

42.
11 MUSLIM IBN AL-HAJJAJ AL-QUSHAYRI, SAHIH MUSLIM BI SHARH ALNAWAWI 76 (1930).
43.
7 AL-WANSHARISI, supranote 27, at 484.
44.
Id. at 478.
45.
Id. at 80.
46.
QUR'AN, 18:30.
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as a legal fiction to prevent revocation of a sale or secure property
whose ownership was contested, to avoid confiscation of property,
or as an act of loving kindness toward a dying husband. The
primary function of the endowment, in this author's view, was to
keep property intact, to assure the entitlement of beneficiaries for
the duration of the object, and to regulate the transmission of
usufriactory rights from one generation to the next. Not only did
the institution accord a founder the freedom to make decisions
that Islamic inheritance law denied him, but the creation of a
family endowment also gave a proprietor a legal means to remove
all or part of a patrimony from the effects of that law. The
creation of an endowment for the benefit of one's children and
descendants-regarded as a pious act-reduced the quantum of
property available as an inheritance for the founder's ascendents,

collaterals,

and

spouse

or

spouses,

thereby

limiting its

fragmentation through inheritance.
Some Western observers have asserted that family
endowments commonly were used to frustrate the inheritance
rights of females. 4 7 The Mi'yar does contain examples of this
phenomenon-albeit fewer than the secondary literature
suggests-but children of both genders were vulnerable to a
4s
founder's preferences.
Founders who created an endowment for sons and their
lineal descendants to the exclusion of daughters and their
descendants frequently stipulated that if the line of males came
to an end, the endowment was to revert to a daughter or her
female descendants. 4 9 The specification of females as secondary
beneficiaries of familial endowments suggests that Muslim society
in the Maghrib during the Marinid period (1258-1465) was not as
rigidly patriarchal as is often asserted.
Indeed, the Mi'yar
indicates that the Maliki family endowment frequently was used
to supplement the rights of females.
Family endowments customarily were created for the benefit
of the founder's male and female children alike.5 0
Certainly,
founders frequently invoked the Qur'anic principle that a son was
to receive twice the share of a daughter.5 1 The founder's ability to
define a descent strategy, however, made it possible to

47.
See OCTAVE PESLE, LA THEORIE ET LA PRATIQUE DES HABOUS DANS LE
RITE MAL8KITE 75 (1930); ERNEST MERCIER, LE CODE DU HABOUS, OU OUAKF,
SELON LA LgGISLATION MUSULMANE: SUIVI DE TEXTES DES BONS AUTEURS ET DE
PIECES ORIGINALES 131 (1899).
48.
See, e.g., 7 AL-WANSHARISI, supra note 27, at 62, 80-82, 270-72, 278-

79, 281, 441.
49.
50.

See id. at 80, 223.
See id. at 9.

51.

QUR'AN 4:12.
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circumvent this provision, if desired. S 2 The stipulation of equality

between males and females could be applied to the founder's
grandchildren and subsequent descendants. For example, a
founder could specify in a deed that the revenues of the
endowment were to be divided "equally among [the founder's]
male and female children and grandchildren."5 3 Such a provision
is significant because it points to the willingness of men to use
the endowment system to treat their daughters and female
grandchildren on an equal basis with their sons and male
grandchildren.
2. Founders and Beneficiaries
Legal texts, by their very nature, conceal important aspects
of the social reality that gave rise to them. The scribes and
jurists who produced fatwas had as their primary objective the
reduction of social and economic conflicts into the objective and
specialized vocabulary of the law. As a result, many of the realia
that would be of interest to social historians are not articulated in
the fatwas. The Mi'yarpreserves the names of only ten founders
54
of family endowments, eight males and two females.
In most instances, the fatwa merely indicated in summary
fashion that, for example, "a man created an endowment for his
three sons" or "a woman created an endowment for her minor
daughters." Although one would prefer a full transcription of the
endowment deed, summary statements of this nature, used with
care, can provide data sufficient to generate a profile of the
typical family endowment in the period under consideration. Of
the seventy-five cases in which both a founder and a beneficiary
are mentioned, seventy-five percent (or, fifty-seven) were created
by fathers and mothers on behalf of their children and, less
frequently, grandchildren. Fathers outnumbered mothers as
founders by a ratio of six to one (forty-eight as opposed to eight).
The remaining twenty-five percent of the endowments were
created for someone other than the founder's children and lineal
descendants. 5 5
These figures suggest that the endowment
system reinforced the boundaries of the Muslim nuclear family
and contributed to its social reproduction.
In regard to the gender distribution of founders vis-&-vis
beneficiaries, the record demonstrates that males commonly used
the endowment to support the interests of other males. Of forty-

52.

See 7 AL-WANSHARISI, supranote 27, at 281.

53.
54.

See, e.g., id. at 141, 269, 343.
See id. at 25, 186, 248, 278, 281, 311, 343, 486 (males); id. at 188, 311

(females).
55.

See id. at 248-57, 343-47, 463-64.
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three endowments created by a father for his children, sons were
specified as the exclusive beneficiaries in sixty percent of the
cases, whereas daughters were specified as exclusive
beneficiaries in only nineteen percent. Sons and daughters were
named as co-beneficiaries in the remaining twenty-one percent of
the cases. Thus, fathers were three times as likely to create an
endowment for sons as for daughters. By contrast, mothers
appeared to have been more even-handed. Of eight endowments
created by mothers for the benefit of their children, three were
created for a son, three were created for one or more daughters,
and the remainder were created for sons and daughters jointly.
Twelve percent of the endowments created by parents for the
benefit of their children specified that the children were minors at
the time the endowment was created. This statistic suggests that
it was common for a parent to establish a family endowment soon
after he or she married and produced offspring. This practice
points to a desire on the part of proprietors to make de facto
arrangements for the ultimate devolution of their property while
they were in the prime of life. This phenomenon required
founders to make special provision for the inclusion of unborn
56
children in the endowment.
If a man had two or more wives, his calculations were more
complex. Some husbands may have wished to favor the offspring
of one wife over those of another. For example, a man created an
endowment for his three minor children, Muhammad, Ahmad,
and 'A'isha, by his wife, Maryam bint Yahya b. al-Ustadh, and for
57
all subsequent male and female children by that same wife.
Presumably, the man had other children from a second wife. By
contrast, another founder treated his sons by his two wives
equally, creating an endowment for his three minor sons "and for
all male children born in the future to his two wives, 'A'isha and
58
Ghaniyya."
A founder could also choose to create an endowment for his
unborn grandchildren and great-grandchildren, a practice that is
documented most frequently in testamentary instruments.
Because a testamentary endowment takes effect only upon the
founder's death, the founder retains control of his property
throughout his lifetime. This advantage is offset by two distinct
disadvantages. First, the endowment is limited to one-third of
the estate. Second, the endowment may not be made in favor of

56.
See id. at 223, 229, 269, 442.
57.
See id. at 281.
58.
Id. at 278. The tendency of male founders to express a preference for
male beneficiaries is even more pronounced in the case of endowments created for

unborn children than in the case of endowments created for currently living
children.
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an heir. 59 The latter restriction entails that a testamentary
endowment may not be created for the benefit of a son or
daughter, thereby posing a dilemma for the founder who wants to
maintain control of his property until he dies but also wishes to
designate one or more children as beneficiary. Because the
prohibition on bequests to heirs does not apply to a grandchild
whose father is alive, a solution to the dilemma was to designate
a currently living or unborn grandchild as the initial beneficiary.
Since a minor grandchild would be subject to the authority of its
father-who was the desired heir-the latter would in effect
control the endowment revenues. Naming an unborn grandchild
or great-grandchild as an endowment beneficiary also gave the
founder an opportunity to favor the offspring of one branch of the
60
family over another.
When a designated family line became extinct, the
endowment revenues reverted to a public institution. Some
founders sought to circumvent this outcome by specifying that
the revenues were to revert to his or her closest relative. 6 1 More
commonly, a founder would specify that the revenues were to
63
revert to "the Muslim poor"62 or to "the poor and indigent."
Some founders made very particular designations, such as, for
example, "the poor and the indigent in Granada and al-Bira,"6 or
"the poor and indigent who reside in the mausoleum of Shaykh
Abu al-'Abbas al-Sibti." 6 S One founder stipulated that upon the
extinction of the designated line, the revenues were to be used to
66
support students, ransom captives, and manumit slaves.
67
Another founder assigned the revenues for the use of lepers.
The most common way to insure the perpetuity of an
endowment was to designate as the ultimate beneficiary a
religious institution, such as a mosque, school, Sufi convent, or
the personnel associated with such an institution.6 8
In a
testamentary endowment created on June 30, 1389, the founder
stipulated that if the first and second branches of lineal
descendants died out, the revenues were to revert to the Jami' alSabirin inside the Victory Gate of Fez for the purchase of olive oil

59.
60.
61.
revenues
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See supranote 2 and accompanying text.
See 7 AL-WANSHARISI, supranote 27, at 311.
See, e.g., id. at 50, 80, 189, 360. The deeds do not specify to whom the
were to revert after the death of the closest relative.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 463.
Id. at 343.
See id. at 438.
See id. at 186.
See, e.g., id. at 46, 281, 452, 459.
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surplus revenues were to be used to feed the poor Sufis and
Murabits associated with the mosque. Other founders designated
70
as the ultimate beneficiary "the muezzin in a Friday mosque,"
or "whoever recites [the Qur'an] over the graves of the founder
71
and his relatives."
3. Endowment Property: Size and Type
Almost without exception, the size of the testamentary
endowments preserved in our source was equal to one-third of
the deceased founder's net assets, which was the maximum
allowed by law. There were no constraints on the size of
endowments created inter vivos, and as a result, many individuals
72
designated part or all of their property as a familial endowment.
In the middle of the fifteenth century, the Zayyanid Sultan, Abu
'Abdallah Muhammad, designated as an endowment for the
benefit of an unnamed religious scholar immovable property that
included lands prepared for sowing, gardens, and a bath. 73 More
commonly, however, a founder designated a discrete piece of
property or a fraction of a property as a familial endowment. More
than half of the endowed properties were urban in character;
forty-five percent included residential property such as a room
(bayt), house (dar), or compound (rab). Non-residential property
such as a shop, bakery, or mill accounted for another eleven
percent. Slightly less than half of the endowed properties were
agricultural in nature. These endowments included gardens,
orchards, and olive groves, which constituted sixteen percent of
the endowed properties, while unspecified agricultural property,
including village properties and entire villages, accounted for
another twenty-four percent. It was not uncommon for a founder
to designate a share of a piece of property as a familial
endowment, such as one-fourth of a jointly held compound, half
of an unspecified share in several shops, two-thirds of a wellknown strip of land, half of a house, or one feddan of land. 74
Although the rate at which property in a given area at a given
time was being transformed into family endowments is unknown,
it is reasonable to assume that over time considerable segments
of the urban and rural landscape were being converted from

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See id. at 312.
Id. at 202.
1& at 141.
See, e.g., id. at 80, 432.
See id. at 248-49.
See id. at 45, 49, 75, 202, 206, 423, 446.
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private property into endowment property, and that efforts to
check or even reverse that process were undertaken as well.

III. AN ANALYSIS OF ENDOWMENT DISPUTES
Unaware of the gender and number of his lineal descendants,
the founder of an endowment would formulate a descent strategy
designed to regulate its smooth functioning for every possible
combination of male and female children and descendants. In an
effort to avoid any ambiguity that might upset the subsequent
functioning of the endowment, the notary who drafted the deed
acted with great care. However, even the most carefully drafted
deed could not anticipate every potential dispute over control of
the endowment. Such disputes typically were of two types: an
external challenge to the endowment by persons who did not
qualify as beneficiaries; or an internal struggle for control of the
revenues among the beneficiaries themselves. The frequency
with which such disputes occurred was partially a function of the
economic importance of the endowment property.
A dispute over control of an endowment might arise during
the lifetime of the founder, or, more commonly, one or more
generations after his death. 75
Such disputes might last for
76
several generations.
A. The Function of Documents
In an era in which no -institutional records were kept of either
births, deaths, or property transactions, private family archives
were of great importance. Written records played a critical role in
the resolution of disputes over family endowments because, as
noted, such disputes might arise one or more generations after
the death of both the endowment's founder and the witnesses to

the deed. 77 For this reason, an endowment deed was deposited

customarily in a family archive for safekeeping, along with other
important records, and would pass from one generation of
beneficiaries to the next. In the event of a dispute, the deed
would be presented to the judicial authorities. 78 The importance
of written documents is dramatically demonstrated in the case of
an endowment created by a certain Abu al-Qasim b. Bashir.

75.
See, e.g., id. at 261-62, 311-21, 435, 452-53.
76.
See id. at 486-514; Powers, A Court Case, supra note 28, at 231.
77.
See, e.g., Powers, A Court Case, supra note 28, at 233, 237
(documenting a dispute that arose in 1376 over an endowment that was founded
before 1328).
78.
See 7 AL-WANSHARISI, supranote 27, at 80-82.
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Each of the parties to this litigation possessed a collection of legal
documents relating to the disputed property, so that during the
were
course of the dispute, twenty-eight different documents
79
entered into the records of various judicial proceedings.
Muslim jurists traditionally have viewed written documents
with a generous measure of suspicion, in part because the
written word can be manipulated in a manner that the oral
testimony of trustworthy persons cannot.8 0 For example, in one
case a woman produced an endowment deed in an effort to
secure her status as a member of the first set of beneficiaries.
The deed, however, was torn. Although the mufti to whom the
case was referred suspected that someone had tampered with the
document, he accepted it as legitimate in its current state.
However, he also warned that whoever had torn the document
would suffer disgrace in both this world and the next.8 1
Another strategy of a person who exercised physical
possession over an endowment deed was to frustrate the claims
of potential beneficiaries by refusing to make the document
Such unscrupulous behavior typically
available to others.
manifested itself in connection with the transfer of entitlement
from one generation of beneficiaries to the next. In one instance,
a man who was the sole surviving member of the second
generation of endowment beneficiaries withheld the endowment
deed from his patrilineal nephews in an effort to keep them
ignorant of its terms.8 2 Presumably unwilling to challenge the
authority of their uncle, the nephews remained silent for several
83
years before taking their case to the judicial authorities.
B. Interpretive StrategiesEmployed by the Jurists
Many muftis refrained from issuing judicial opinions until
they had seen a certified transcription of the original endowment
deed.8 4 On occasion, the muftis complained about the summary
nature of the transcription.8 5 Only when a mufti was presented
with an accurate transcription of the endowment deed could the

79.
See Powers, A Court Case, supra note 28, at 231 (reconstructing, on the
basis of the twenty-eight written documents, a prolonged legal dispute over a
family endowment involving six generations of a family).
80.
See, e.g., EMILE TYAN, LE NOTARIAT ET LE R2GIME DE LA PREUVE PAR
PCRIT DANS LA PRATIQUE DU DROIT MUSULMAN (2d. ed. 1959); Jeanette A. Wakin,
Introduction to THE FUNCTION OF DOCUMENTS IN ISLAMIC LAW: THE CHAPTERS ON
SALES FROM TAHAWI'S KITAB AL-SHURUT AL-KABIR 4-16 (Jeanette A. Walin ed.,
1972).
81.
See 7 AL-WANSHARISI, supranote 27, at 455.
82.
See id. at 278-81.
83.
See id.
84.
See id. at 228-30.
85.
See id. at 81.
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interpretive task begin in earnest. Regardless of the notary's care
in formulating the deed, the detail of the descent strategy
specified therein, and the length of the resulting document, the
subsequent demographic history of a family8 6 frequently resulted
in situations for which the founder had not left clear instructions,
and therefore required the intervention of either a judge, or if the
case was difficult, a mufti. The jurists were asked to determine
exactly what the founder had intended at the time of the
endowment's creation.
They generally assumed that the
founder's intention could be ascertained from the words
preserved in the endowment deed, irrespective of the passage of
time or the changed circumstances of the endowment
beneficiaries.8 7 The jurists treated the founder's words as being
sacred and immutable, comparing them to God's words as
preserved in the Qur'an.8 8
Both the mustafti (the person who formulates the question)
and the mufti repeatedly refer to the founder's intention using the
Arabic terms irada and qasd.8 9 In response to the contention
that the revenues of a testamentary endowment created for both
living and unborn persons should be frozen until all of the
potential beneficiaries had come into existence, the mufti alMazjaldi said, "This [conclusion] is not required by either the
founder's words or his intention."90 Toward the end of the
fifteenth century, Ahmad al-Wansharisi was asked to consider
the meaning of a clause in an endowment deed that read, "If one
of them dies without any descendants, his share reverts to his
aforementioned

two brothers

(akhawayu)."9 1

Al-Wansharisi

declared that the founder's use of the dual form of the noun
"brother" indicated that he did not intend for this stipulation to
apply generally to any generation of beneficiaries, but rather
specifically and exclusively to the first generation. Had the
founder intended otherwise, the mufti added, he would have used
another formulation.
C. Analysis of Case Studies
The 101 fatwas upon which the present study is based deal
with a range of issues that defies any singular, comprehensive

86.
That is, its pattern of births, deaths, and marriages.
87.
See 7 AL-VANSHARISI, supranote 27, at 285.
88.
See id. at 285; cf. id. at 280. One Andalusian jurist wrote: 'The words
of the founder are like the words of the Divine Lawgiver. Their sense must be
followed with respect to both formulation (nusus)and external meaning (zawair]."
Id. at 280.
89.
See, e.g., id. at 26, 229, 316.
90.
Id. at 23; cf. i. at 196.
91.
Id. at 356.
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treatment. For the purpose of analysis, the cases are classified
here according to the nature of the relationship between litigants.
Thus, each dispute has been assigned to one of three distinct
sets: disputes between endowment beneficiaries and other
relatives of the founder who do not qualify as beneficiaries;
disputes between the founder and his children; and disputes over
transmission of entitlement from the first to the second, or the
second to the third and subsequent generations of beneficiaries.
1. Beneficiaries Versus the Founder's Heirs and Agnates
As noted, the Islamic inheritance system contains rules for
92
the regulation of both inheritance and family endowments.
Inheritance law imposes compulsory rules for the division of
property among a wide group of male and female heirs, each of
whom receives a fractional share of the estate as private property
that subsequently may be bought, sold, or recycled as an
inheritance. Left unchecked, inheritance law would result in the
inevitable fragmentation of property. Endowment law, however,
enables a proprietor to remove all or part of a patrimony from the
effects of the inheritance rules by reducing the amount of
property available as an inheritance to those of the founder's
potential heirs who do not qualify as beneficiaries of a familial
endowment. Unlike the compulsory inheritance rules, endowment
law allows a proprietor to allocate usufructory entitlements to
specified people in specified amounts, regulate the transmission
of those entitlements from one generation of beneficiaries to the
next, and insure the physical and economic integrity of an estate
or a piece of property. 93 The wide gap separating these two sets
of legal norms may be illustrated by comparing the group
composed of the beneficiaries of a familial endowment with the
group composed of the founder's heirs. While most beneficiaries
are also heirs, the great majority of heirs do not qualify as
beneficiaries. Thus, a man who establishes an endowment for his
children and lineal descendants effectively disinherits his spouse,
siblings, cousins, uncles, nephews, and others. 9 4 Because they
have been disinherited, these "outsiders" have an obvious
material interest in challenging the validity of the endowment. A
successful challenge will result in the property's redesignation as
inheritable property. The heirs, spouse, siblings, and other
relatives stand to inherit a fractional share of the estate. 95 In
many of the cases preserved in the source, the plaintiffs are

92.
93.
94.
95.

See discussion supraPart L.A-B.
See supranote 18 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 17-18 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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collectively referred to as either the founder's heirs (waratha)or
96
agnatic relatives (asaba).
Endowments created from jointly-held property frequently
resulted in disputes between the endowment beneficiaries and
the founder's other heirs. In several instances, the dispute was
resolved by the physical division of the property. 9 7
The
relationship between endowment beneficiaries and others could
be complicated if the relative amount of endowed and unendowed
portions of jointly held property was unknown. 98 In a fifteenthcentury case, ignorance of the respective proportions of endowed
and unendowed property resulted from carelessness on the part
of the notary who had formulated the endowment deed. 9 9
The complex interplay between inheritance law and
endowment law, on the one hand, and between these two sets of
conflicting norms and social realities, on the other, created an
incentive for those persons who qualified as heirs and endowment
beneficiaries to manipulate the legal system so that the judicial
authorities would redefine private property as endowment
property or vice-versa.
2. Founders and Their Children: The Problem of Hiyaza
Unlike their Hanafi counterparts, Malid jurists did not
permit the founder of an inter vivos family endowment to serve as
the initial beneficiary.' 0 0
This meant that the numerous
advantages of the endowment system vis-&-vis the inheritance
laws were offset by the requirement that the founder immediately
relinquish physical control of the property. This requirement ran
counter to the natural human desire to retain effective control of
one's property until one dies. Many proprietors circumvented
this obstacle by creating an endowment while their children were
either unborn or minors. The law allows a founder who creates
an endowment for a minor child to exercise control of the
property on behalf of the child. 01 ' However, the law requires the
founder to spend the endowment revenues on the needs of the
child. When the child reaches the age of legal majority, the
founder is obligated to convey the property to the young adult by
02
means of the legal ceremony known as hiyaza.'

96.
For examples of inheritance of fractional shares, see 7 AL-WANSHARISI,
supra note 27, at 104-05, 228-29.
97.
See, e.g., id. at 49, 432.
98.

99.
100.
101.
which the
102.

See id. at 72.

See id. at 45-46.
See Cattan, supra note 26, at 203-04.
Except when the property designated as an endowment is a house in
founder resides.
See supranote 35 and accompanying text.

1999]

ISLAMIC FAMILY ENDOWMENT

1187

In practice, many founders ignored these regulations,
spending the endowment revenues on their own interests and
continuing to exercise de facto control of the endowment even
after a child had reached the age of legal majority. This
irregularity exposed the endowment to subsequent challenge and
10 3
possible nullification.
When the object of an endowment was a house in which the
founder resided, the founder was obligated to vacate the premises
for one year. Although failure to observe this rule could result in
nullification of the endowment, in practice many founders
ignored the rule.' 0 4 A founder's failure to observe the one-year
rule could result in litigation setting parent against child.' 0 5
What appears to have been at stake in these disputes between
parents and children was the exact timing of the transfer of
resources-and, hence, of power and authority-from one
generation to the next.
3. Disputes over Transmission of Entitlement from the
Beneficiaries of the First Generation to Those of the Second and
Subsequent Generations
Questions relating to the timing of economic transfers
surface again in the third category of dispute, namely, the
transmission of entitlement to the endowment revenues from the
first generation of beneficiaries to the second and subsequent
generations. At this stage, three issues appear repeatedly in the
source. First, the determination of whether or not an endowment
became mu'aqqab. Second, in the event that it did, the criterion
according to which the revenues were to be divided among the
qualifying beneficiaries. Third, the definition of the lineal descent
group for which the endowment had been created.
The first issue had important consequences for the division
of revenues among the founder's lineal descendants. If an
endowment does become mu'aqqab, the revenues in theory were
to be divided among all of the founder's living lineal descendants
irrespective of their generation. If the endowment does not
become mu'aqqab, the revenues were controlled by the members
of the oldest generation. In practice, a younger generation of
descendants often contended that the endowment had become
mu'aqqab, while the surviving members of an older generation
insisted that it had not. In disputes of this nature, one or more
paternal uncles might try to prevent the inclusion of their
nephews in the division of the endowment revenues. Typically,
103.
104.
105.

See 7 AL-WANSHARISI, supranote 27, at 202-03.
See idl at 218, 426.
See id. at 202, 260-62.

1188

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 32:1167

the mustafti asked the mufti to determine whether or not the
nephews were entitled to participate in the endowment together
with their uncles.
If it was determined that an endowment had in fact become
muteaqqab, there remained the determination of the criterion
according to which the revenues were to be divided among the
qualifying beneficiaries. Some authorities maintained that they
should be divided on a per capita basis, while others held that
the judge should allocate the revenues according to need, as
determined by his independent reasoning. 10 6 Need was defined
by a number of variables, including family size, financial
resources, and degree of the beneficiary's relationship to the
founder.107
In their discussions of this issue, the jurists
manifested an explicit concern for the notion of equity.10 8
The third recurring issue in struggles between adjacent
generations of lineal descendants related to the principle of
agnation, a principle that is reflected in the definition of terms
such as walad and ¢aqib. The term walad was defined by the
founder of the Maliki law school, Malik b. Anas, as "a man's sons
and daughters and his son's children, males to the exclusion of
females." An uninterrupted line of jurists from Malik to alWansharisi defined the word 'aqib as "the descendants of a
person who are not separated from him by a female link."10 9
Thus, a female may qualify as a member of an agnatic lineal
descent group, but she does not transmit this status to either her
sons or daughters. Presumably, this restriction results from the
legal notion of agnation, which is related to the socio-cultural
assumption that a woman's children become members of her
husband's agnatic group, not her father's. If a man creates a
family endowment for his son and the latter's lineal descendants,
the principle of agnation therefore will exclude progressively from
the resulting lineal descent group both female and male cognatic
descendants of the founder. These cognates are referred to as
"the children of daughters" (awlad al-banat).
Once again, theoretical considerations often were ignored in
practice since "the children of daughters" frequently sought
inclusion in a lineal descent group established by a founder.
Even more striking is that a series of muftis interpreted the terms
of a particular endowment in such a manner as to validate their
claims. Paradoxically, this approach to the issue of genderliberal in the eyes of a modern observer-was made possible by
the muftis' adoption of a literalist approach to statutory

106.
107.
108.
109.

See id. at 358.
See id. at 88, 358, 396, 462, 478, 484.
See id. at 359.
Id. at 281-85.
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interpretation, as illustrated by a case referred to the Cordovan
jurist, Ibn Rushd (d. 1126). A man created an endowment for his
two concubines, stipulating that when both had died, the
endowment was to revert to his two paternal cousins, Ahmad and
al-Hasan, and to "their descendants and their descendants'
descendants."
The two concubines died, while Ahmad died
leaving no descendants. Al-Hasan, however, produced at least
three generations of lineal descendants, including a grandson

whose mother was al-Hasan's daughter, and a great-grandson
whose mother was al-Hasan's agnatic granddaughter (his son's
son's daughter). Although neither of these two persons was
agnatically related to al-Hasan because of the intervening female
link, both sought inclusion as beneficiaries of the endowment.
Ibn Rushd ruled that the grandson qualified but that the greatgrandson did not. Applying what may be called the transitive
principle of interpretation, Ibn Rushd reasoned that al-Hasan's
daughter was his agnatic descendant and that her son qualified
as the "descendants' descendant" mentioned in the deed. The
great-grandson, on the other hand, did not qualify as a
beneficiary because the founder had not specified "the
descendant of a descendant's descendant." Presumably, had the
founder included this phrase, the great-grandson would have
qualified as a beneficiary.' 1 0 Maliki jurists subsequently treated
the reasoning behind Ibn Rushd's ruling as legal precedent."'

IV. CONCLUSION
As part of the larger Islamic inheritance system, endowment
law accorded Muslim proprietors a legal means to circumvent the
effects of the Islamic inheritance rules by allocating usufruct
rights to specified people in specified amounts and to regulate the
transmission of those rights from one generation of beneficiaries
to the next.
Over time, the institution appears to have
contributed to the physical integrity of both urban and rural
property. Whether or not it also contributed to the economic
viability of the local economy is a subject that deserves further

investigation."

2

At the same time, the transformation of

significant segments of the rural and urban landscape into

110.

See id. at 463-64; see also Powers, Fatwas,supranote 28, at 313; cf. 7

AL-WANSHARISI, supranote 27, at 462-63.
111.

See, e.g., 7 AL-WANSHARISI, supra note 27, at 51, 186-87, 191-92, 343-

47, 354-58.
112.
See, e.g., MIRIAM HOEXTER, ENDOWMENTS, RULERS AND COMMUNITY:
WAQF AL-HARAMAYN IN OTTOMAN ALGIERS 141-43 (Studies in Islamic Law and
Soc'y, Rudolf Peters & Bernard Weiss eds., vol. 6, 1998).
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familial endowments frequently resulted in discord, conflict, and
litigation. 113 The members of a lineal descent group acted as a
kind of "corporation" bound by ties of blood and by economic
interests in the endowment property. Those interests had to be
defended against the attempted incursions of "outsiders," usually
relatives of the founder who did not qualify as endowment
beneficiaries. The latter had a powerful incentive to challenge the
validity of a particular endowment, because a successful
challenge might result in their inheriting the property in full
ownership. In this context, the interface between endowment law
and inheritance rules created a calculus of material interest that
encouraged individuals to manipulate the rules in order to

advance their own interests.
Discord also surfaced among members of a lineal descent
group. Like any corporate enterprise, descent groups functioned
smoothly at times, less smoothly at others. The transfer of
usufruct rights from one generation to the next often engendered
conflict and competition among members of the group, as, for
example, between fathers and sons, brothers and sisters, and
uncles and nephews. Some individuals were ruthless in their
efforts to seize or maintain control of usufruct rights, as disputes
over the control of these rights sometimes extended over
decades. 114
The disputes analyzed here point to an ongoing debate in
Muslim society about the meaning of family, kinship, and
descent. Some cases support the notion that pre-modern Muslim
society was rigidly patriarchal. Males often created familial
endowments to support the interests of other males, while the
entitlement of a female beneficiary was especially vulnerable to
challenge. Furthermore, some jurists defined membership within
a particular lineal descent group exclusively in terms of agnation.
Other cases, however, indicate that pre-modern Muslim society
was not as rigidly patriarchal as is commonly assumed.
Endowments typically were created for males and females;
indeed, some founders treated males and females on a basis of
equality. Meanwhile, some jurists upheld the entitlement of
cognatic descendants of the founder, invoking the transitive
principle of interpretation for the sake of a broader, more
inclusive definition of kinship.

113. See generally, e.g., 7 AL-WANSHARISI, supra note 27.
114. Whether the competitive behavior associated with endowment disputes
was in fact characteristic of the Maliki West in the period under question deserves
further consideration. One should bear in mind, however, that the cases under
review here are not necessarily representative of Muslim society in general.

